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This proposed rule is no longer the most current information.
It will continue to be available for reference, but the
final rule has been published. View
the final rule.
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Proposed Standards for Privacy and Individually Identifiable Health
Information
Section 804(2) of title 5, United States Code (as added by section
251 of Public Law 104-121), specifies that a major rule
is any rule that the Office of Management and Budget finds is likely
to result in-
- An annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more;
- A major increase in costs or prices for consumers, individual
industries, Federal, State, or local government agencies, or geographic
regions; or
- Significant adverse effects in competition, employment, investment
productivity, innovation, or on the ability of Unites States based
enterprises to compete with foreign- based enterprises in domestic
and export markets.
We estimate that the impact of this final rule will be over $1
billion in the first year of implementation. Therefore, this rule
is a major rule as defined in Title 5, United States Code, section
804(2).
DHHS has examined the impacts of this proposed rule under Executive
Order 12866. Executive Order 12866 directs agencies to assess all
costs and benefits of available regulatory alternatives and, when
regulation is necessary, to select regulatory approaches that maximize
net benefits (including potential economic, environmental, public
health and safety effects; distributive impacts; and equity). According
to Executive Order 12866, a regulatory action is significant
if it meets any one of a number of specified conditions, including
having an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or adversely
affecting in a material way a sector of the economy, competition,
or jobs or if it raises novel legal or policy issues. DHHS finds
that this proposed rule is a significant regulatory action as defined
by Executive Order 12866. Also in accordance with the provisions
of Executive Order 12866, this proposed rule was reviewed by the
Office of Management and Budget.
When this proposed rule becomes a final rule, in accordance with
the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement and Fairness Act (Pub.
L. 104-121), the Administrator of the Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs of the Office of Management and Budget (the Administrator)
has determined that this proposed rule would be a major rule for
the purpose of congressional review. A major rule for this purpose
is defined in 5 U.S.C. 804(2) as one that the Administrator has
determined has resulted or is likely to result in an annual effect
on the economy of $100 million or more; a major increase in costs
or prices for consumers, individual industries, federal State, or
local government agencies, or geographic regions; or significant
adverse effects on competition, employment, investment, productivity,
innovation, or on the ability of U.S.-based enterprises to compete
with foreign-based enterprises in domestic or export markets.
The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996
(HIPAA) projects a significant increase in the number of medical
transactions that will be conducted or transmitted electronically.
HIPAA notes the privacy needs that result when individually identifiable
health information can be transmitted quickly through electronic
information systems. While there is a compelling need to protect
the privacy of health information in todays health care system,
the expected growth of electronic systems to aide medical diagnostics,
claims processing and research makes it even more critical to improve
privacy protections.
A fundamental assumption of this regulation is that the greatest
benefits of improved privacy protection will be realized in the
future as patients gain increasing trust in health care practitioners
ability to maintain the confidentiality of their health information.
Furthermore, our analysis rests on the principle that health information
privacy is a right, and as such, cannot be valued solely by market
costs. Because it is difficult to measure future benefits based
on present data, our estimates of the costs and benefits of this
regulation are based on the current business environment and do
not include projections beyond five years. As a result, we cannot
accurately account for all of the regulations future costs
and benefits, but the Department is confident that future benefits
will be higher than those stated in this analysis.
In order to achieve a reasonable level of privacy protection, we
have three objectives for the proposed rule: 1) to establish baseline
standards for health care privacy protection, 2) to establish protection
for all health information maintained or transmitted by covered
entities, and 3) to protect the privacy of health information that
is maintained in electronic form, as well as health information
generated by electronic systems.
Establishing minimum standards for health care privacy protection
is an attempt to create a baseline level of privacy protection for
patients across States. The Health Privacy Projects report,
The State of Health Privacy: An Uneven Terrain (1)
makes it clear that under the current system of state laws, privacy
protection is extremely variable. Our statutory authority under
HIPAA allows us to preempt state laws when state law provides less
stringent privacy protection than the regulation. Only in cases
where state law does not protect the patients health information
as stringently as in this proposed rule, or when state law is more
restrictive of a patients right to access their own health
care information, will our rule preempt state law. We discuss preemption
in greater detail in other parts of the preamble (see the effects
of the rule on state laws, section 2 below).
Our second objective is to establish a uniform base of protection
for all health information maintained or transmitted by covered
entities. As discussed in the preamble, HIPAA restricts the type
of entities covered by the proposed rule to three broad categories:
health care providers, health care clearinghouses, and health plans.
However, there are similar public and private entities that we do
not have the authority to regulate under HIPAA. For example, life
insurance companies are not covered by this proposed rule but have
access to a large amount of protected health information. State
government agencies not directly linked to public health functions
or health oversight may also have access to protected health information.
Examples of this type of agency include the motor vehicle administration,
which frequently maintains individual health information, and welfare
agencies that routinely hold health information about their clients.
Our third objective is to protect the privacy of health information
that is maintained in electronic form, as well as health information
generated by electronic systems. Health information is currently
stored and transmitted in multiple forms, including in electronic,
paper, and oral formats. In order to provide consistent protection
to information that has been electronically transmitted or maintained,
we propose that this rule cover all personal, protected health information
that has ever been maintained or transmitted electronically. This
type of information includes output such as computer printouts,
X-rays, magnetic tape, and other information that was originally
maintained or transmitted electronically. For example, laboratory
tests are often computer generated, printed out on paper, and then
stored in a patients record. Because such lab results were
originally maintained electronically, the post-electronic (i.e.
printed) output of those lab results would also be covered under
the proposed rule.
It is important to note that the use of electronic systems to maintain
and transmit health information is growing among health care providers,
and health plans. Faulkner and Gray report that provider use of
electronically processed health transactions grew from 47 percent
to 62 percent between 1994 and 1998. Payer use of electronic transactions
grew 17 percent between 1996 and 1997. Once all of the HIPAA administrative
simplification standards are implemented, we expect the number of
electronic transactions processed by payers and providers to grow.
The variation in business practice regarding use of paper records
versus electronic media for storing and transmitting health information
is captured by comparing the percentage of providers that submit
paper claims with those that submit electronic claims. Faulkner
& Grays Health Data Directory (2)
shows that only 40 percent of non-Medicare physician claims and
16 percent of dental claims were submitted electronically in 1998.
In contrast, 88 percent of all pharmacy claims were submitted electronically.
We believe that most physicians either have, or will have in the
near future, the capacity to submit claims electronically. Faulkner
and Gray reported that in 1998, 81 percent of physicians with Medicare
patients submitted their Medicare claims electronically. The difference
in the percent of electronic clams submitted to Medicare suggests
that the physicians decisions to submit claims electronically
may be heavily influenced by the administrative requirements of
the health plan receiving the claim. Since HIPAA requires all health
plans to accept electronic transactions and, in order to compete
in the technologically driven health care market, more health plans
may require electronic claims submissions, physicians will conduct
many more electronic transactions in the near future. Therefore,
it is extremely important that adequate privacy protections are
implemented now.
A. Relationship of this Analysis to Analyses in Other HIPAA Regulations.
Historically, Congress has recognized that privacy standards must
accompany the electronic data interchange standards and that the
increased ease of transmitting and sharing individually identifiable
health information must be accompanied by an increase in the privacy
and confidentiality. In fact, the majority of the bulk of the first
Administrative Simplification section that was debated on the floor
of the Senate in 1994 (as part of the Health Security Act) was made
up of privacy provisions. Although the requirement for the issuance
of concomitant privacy standards remained a part of the bill passed
by the House of Representatives, the requirement for privacy standards
was removed in conference. This section was moved from the standard-setting
authority of Title XI (section 1173 of the Act) and placed in a
separate section of HIPAA, section 264. Subsection (b) of section
264 required the Secretary of HHS to develop and submit to the Congress
recommendations for:
(1) The rights that an individual who is a subject of individually
identifiable health information should have.
(2) The procedures that should be established for the exercise
of such rights.
(3) The uses and disclosures of such information that should be
authorized or required.
The Secretary's Recommendations were submitted to the Congress
on September 11, 1997, and are summarized below. Section 264(c)(1)
provides that:
If legislation governing standards with respect to the privacy
of individually identifiable health information transmitted in
connection with the transactions described in section 1173(a)
of the Social Security Act (as added by section 262) is not enacted
by [August 21, 1999], the Secretary of Health and Human Services
shall promulgate final regulations containing such standards not
later than [February 21, 2000]. Such regulations shall address
at least the subjects described in subsection (b).
As the Congress did not enact legislation governing standards with
respect to the privacy of individually identifiable health information
prior to August 21, 1999, HHS has now, in accordance with this statutory
mandate, developed proposed rules setting forth standards to protect
the privacy of such information.
These privacy standards have been, and continue to be, an integral
part of the suite of Administrative Simplification standards intended
to simplify and improve the efficiency of the administration of
our health care system.
The proposed rule should be considered along with all of the administrative
simplification standards required by HIPAA. We assessed several
strategies for determining the impact of this proposed rule. We
considered whether it would be accurate to view the impact as a
subset of the overall HIPAA standards or whether this privacy component
should be viewed as an addition to the earlier impact analyses related
to HIPAA. We decided that while this proposed rule is considered
one of the HIPAA standards, any related costs or benefits should
be viewed as an addition to earlier analyses. The original HIPAA
analyses did not incorporate the expected costs and benefits of
privacy regulation because, at the time of the original analyses,
we did not know whether Congress would enact legislation or whether
privacy would need to be addressed by regulation. Therefore, much
of our cost analysis is based on the expected incremental costs
above those related to other HIPAA regulations.
B. Summary of Costs and Benefits.
The Department has estimated the costs and benefits of the proposed
rule based on several caveats. In general, it is difficult to estimate
the costs and benefits of improved privacy protection. The ability
to measure costs of the proposed regulation is limited because there
is very little data currently available on the cost of privacy protection.
The Department has not been able to estimate costs for a number
of requirements of the proposed regulation that we know will impose
some cost to covered entities. For those elements for which there
are estimated costs, data and information limitations limit the
precision of the Departments estimates; for those reasons
we have provided an overall range of costs in addition to point
estimates, and welcome further information from the public as part
of the comment process. Furthermore, the number of new privacy requirements
that the regulation will introduce to the health care industry exacerbates
difficulties estimating the benefits of privacy. Benefits are difficult
to measure because we conceive of privacy primarily as a right and
secondarily as a commodity. As discussed below, the significant
benefits of the proposed regulation to individuals and society can
be demonstrated by illustrating the serious privacy concerns raised
by mental health, substance abuse, cancer screening, and HIV/AIDS
patients and the benefits that may be derived from greater privacy.
The estimated cost of compliance with the proposed rule would be
at least $3.8 billion over five years. The cost includes estimates
for the majority of the requirements of the proposed regulation,
but not all. These estimates include costs to federal, State, and
local governments. Federal, and State and local costs are therefore
a subset of total costs. Based on a plausible range of costs for
the key components of the analysis, the cost of the regulation would
likely be in the range $1.8 to $6.3 billion over five years (not
including those elements of the regulation for which we could not
make any cost estimates).
The compliance costs are in addition to Administrative Simplification
estimates. The cost of complying with the privacy regulation represents
about 0.09 percent of projected national health expenditures during
the first year following the regulations enactment. The five-year
cost of the proposed regulation also represents 1.0 percent of the
increase in health care costs that will occur during the same five-year
period (3).
The largest cost item is the amending and correcting of records,
which would represent over one-half of total costs. Provider and
plan notices, which we estimate would cost $439 million, is the
second largest cost, and inspection and copying of records is estimated
to be $405 million. The one-time costs for providers to develop
policies and procedures represent somewhat less than 10 percent
of the total cost, or $333 million. Plans would bear a substantially
smaller cost--approximately $62 million. Other systems changes would
cost about $90 million over the period. The cost of administering
written authorizations would total approximately $271 million over
five years.
The cost estimates include private- and public-sector costs. Many
of the public- sector cost elements will be the same as those in
the private market. However, privacy notices are likely to represent
a smaller fraction of total public-sector costs, while systems compliance
costs in the public sector may be higher than in the private sector
due to oversight and administrative requirements.
The costs presented in this document are the Departments
best estimates of the cost of implementing the proposed regulation
based on available information and data. Because of inadequate data,
we have not made cost estimates for the following compnents of the
regulation: the principle of minimum necessary disclosure; the requirement
that entities monitor business partners with whom they share PHI;
creation of de-identified information; internal complaint processes;
sanctions; compliance and enforcement; the designation of a privacy
official and creation of a privacy board; and additional requirements
on research/optional disclosures that will be imposed by the regulation.
The cost of these provisions may be significant in some cases, but
it would be inaccurate to project costs for these requirements given
the fact that several of these concepts are new to the industry,
and there is little direct evidence on costs. We solicit comment
regarding costs of the regulation that we have not quantified.
The privacy protections established by this regulation will provide
major social benefits. Establishing privacy protection as a fundamental
right is an important goal and will have significant, non-quantifiable
social benefits. A well-designed privacy standard can be expected
to build confidence among the public about the confidentiality of
their health information. Increased confidence in the privacy of
an individuals health information can be expected to increase
the likelihood that many people will seek treatment for particular
classes of disease, particularly mental health conditions, sexually
transmitted diseases such as HIV/AIDS, and earlier screening for
certain cancers. The increased utilization of medical services that
would result from increased confidence in privacy would lead to
improved health for the individuals involved, reduced costs to society
associated with delayed treatments, and improved public health attributable
to reduced transmission of communicable diseases.
Table 1. The Cost of Complying with the Proposed Privacy
Regulation, in Dollars
|
| Provision |
Initial or First Year Cost
(2000) |
Annual Cost after the First
Year |
Five Year (2000-2004) Cost
|
| Development of Policies and Procedures-
Providers (totaling 871,294) |
$333,000,000 |
|
$333,000,000 |
| Development of Policies and Procedures-
Plans (totaling 18,225) |
$62,000,000 |
|
$62,000,000 |
| System Changes- All Entities |
$90,000,000 |
|
$90,000,000 |
| Notice Development Cost- All Entities
|
$20,000,000 |
|
$30,000,000 |
| Notice Issuance- Providers |
$59,730,000 |
$37,152,000 |
$208,340,000 |
| Notice Issuance- Plans |
$46,200,000 |
$46,200,000 |
$231,000,000 |
| Inspection/Copying |
$81,000,000 |
$81,000,000 |
$405,000,000 |
| Amendment/Correction |
$407,000,000 |
$407,000,000 |
$2,035,000,000 |
| Written Authorization |
$54,300,000 |
$54,300,000 |
$271,500,000 |
| Paperwork/Training |
$22,000,000 |
$22,000,000 |
$110,000,000 |
| Other Costs* |
N/E** |
N/E |
N/E |
| Total |
$1,165,230,000 |
$647,652,000 |
$3,775,840,000 |
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*Other Costs include: minimum necessary disclosure; monitoring
business partners with whom entities share PHI; creation of
de-identified information; internal complaint processes; sanctions;
compliance and enforcement; the designation of a privacy official
and creation of a privacy board; additional requirements on
research/optional disclosures that will be imposed by the
regulation.
**N/E = Not estimated
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We promote the view that privacy protection is an important personal
right, and suggest that the greatest of the benefits of the proposed
regulation are impossible to estimate based on the market value
of health information alone. However, it is possible to evaluate
some of the benefits that may accrue to individuals as a result
of proposed regulation, and these benefits, alone, demonstrate that
the regulation is warranted.
These benefits are considered both qualitatively and quantitatively.
As a framework for the discussion, the cost of the provisions in
the regulation that have been quantified is $0.46 per health care
encounter. Although the value of privacy cannot be fully calculated,
it is worth noting that if individuals would be willing to pay more
than $0.46 per health care encounter to improve health information
privacy, the benefits of the proposed regulation would outweigh
the cost.
Several qualitative examples illustrate the benefits of the proposed
regulation. In one case, medical privacy concerns may prevent patients
from obtaining early testing and screening for certain types of
cancer. Of types of cancer for which screening is available, survival
rates might increase to 95 percent diagnosed in the early stages
(4). For HIV/AIDS patients, new treatments for
patients who are diagnosed with HIV in the early stages may save
$23,700 per quality-adjusted year of life saved (5).
Later in this document, the potential to reduce illness and disability
associated with sexually transmitted diseases is discussed.
We recognize that many of the costs and benefits of health information
privacy are difficult to quantify, but we believe that our estimates
represent a reasonable range of the economic costs and benefits
associated with the regulation.
C. Need for the Proposed Action.
Privacy is a fundamental right. As such, it has to be viewed differently
than any ordinary economic good. Although the costs and benefits
of a regulation need to be considered as a means of identifying
and weighing options, it is important not to lose sight of the inherent
meaning of privacy: it speaks to our individual and collective freedom.
A right to privacy in personal information has historically found
expression in American law. All fifty states today recognize in
tort law a common law or statutory right to privacy. Many states
specifically provide a remedy for public revelation of private facts.
Some states, such as California and Tennessee, have a right to privacy
as a matter of state constitutional law. The multiple historical
sources for legal rights to privacy are traced in many places, including
Chapter 13 of Alan Westin's Privacy and Freedom and in Ellen
Alderman & Caroline Kennedy, The Right to Privacy (1995).
To take but one example, the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution guarantees that "the right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated." By referring
to the need for security of "persons" as well as "papers
and effects" the Fourth Amendment suggests enduring values
in American law that relate to privacy. The need for security of
"persons" is consistent with getting patient consent before
performing invasive medical procedures. The need for security in
"papers and effects" underscores the importance of protecting
information about the person, contained in sources such as personal
diaries, medical records, or elsewhere. As is generally true for
the right of privacy in information, the right is not absolute.
The test instead is what constitutes an "unreasonable"
search of the papers and effects.
The United States Supreme Court has specifically upheld the constitutional
protection of personal health information. In Whalen v. Roe,
429 U.S. 589 (1977), the Court analyzed a New York statute that
created a database of persons who obtained drugs for which there
was both a lawful and unlawful market. The Court, in upholding the
statute, recognized at least two different kinds of interests within
the constitutionally protected "zone of privacy." "One
is the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters,"
such as this proposed regulation principally addresses. This interest
in avoiding disclosure, discussed in Whalen in the context
of medical information, was found to be distinct from a different
line of cases concerning "the interest in independence in making
certain kinds of important decisions." In the recent case of
Jaffee v. Redmond, 116 S.Ct. 1923 (1996), the Supreme Court
held that statements made to a therapist during a counseling session
were protected against civil discovery under the Federal Rules of
Evidence. The Court noted that all fifty states have adopted some
form of the psychotherapist-patient privilege. In upholding the
federal privilege, the Supreme Court stated that it "serves
the public interest by facilitating the appropriate treatment for
individuals suffering the effects of a mental or emotional problem.
The mental health of our citizenry, no less than its physical health,
is a public good of transcendent importance."
Many writers have urged a philosophical or common-sense right to
privacy in one's personal information. Examples include Alan Westin,
Privacy and Freedom (1967) and Janna Malamud Smith, Private
Matters: In Defense of the Personal Life (1997). These writings
emphasize the link between privacy and freedom and privacy and the
"personal life," or the ability to develop one's own personality
and self-expression. Smith, for instance, states:
The bottom line is clear. If we continually, gratuitously, reveal
other people's privacies, we harm them and ourselves, we undermine
the richness of the personal life, and we fuel a social atmosphere
of mutual exploitation. Let me put it another way: Little in life
is as precious as the freedom to say and do things with people
you love that you would not say or do if someone else were present.
And few experiences are as fundamental to liberty and autonomy
as maintaining control over when, how, to whom, and where you
disclose personal material. Id. at 240-241.
Individuals' right to privacy in information about themselves is
not absolute. It does not, for instance, prevent reporting of public
health information on communicable diseases or stop law enforcement
from getting information when due process has been observed. But
many people believe that individuals should have some right to control
personal and sensitive information about themselves.
Among different sorts of personal information, health information
is among the most sensitive. Many people believe that details about
their physical self should not generally be put on display for neighbors,
employers, and government officials to see. Informed consent laws
place limits on the ability of other persons to intrude physically
on a person's body. Similar concerns apply to intrusions on information
about the person. Moving beyond these facts of physical treatment,
there is likely a greater intrusion when the medical records reveal
details about a person's mental state, such as during treatment
for mental health. If, in Justice Brandeis' words, the "right
to be let alone" means anything, then it likely applies to
having outsiders have access to one's intimate thoughts, words,
and emotions.
In addition to these arguments based on the right to privacy in
personal information, market failures will arise to the extent that
privacy is less well protected than the parties would have agreed
to, if they were fully informed and had the ability to monitor and
enforce contracts. The chief market failures with respect to privacy
concern information, negotiating, and enforcement costs. The information
costs arise because of the information asymmetry between the company
and the patient -- the company typically knows far more than the
patient about how the information will be used by that company.
A health care provider or plan, for instance, knows many details
about how protected health information will be generated, combined
with other databases, or sold to third parties.
Patients face at least two layers of cost in learning about how
their information is used. First, as with many aspects of health
care, patients face the challenge of trying to understand technical
medical terminology and practices. It will often be difficult for
a patient to understand the medical records and the implications
of transferring various parts of such records to a third party.
Second, especially in the absence of consistent national rules,
patients may face significant costs in trying to learn and understand
the nature of a company's privacy policies.
The costs of learning about companies' policies are magnified by
the difficulty patients face in detecting whether companies in fact
are complying with those policies. Patients might try to adopt strategies
for monitoring whether companies have complied with their announced
policies. For instance, if a person received health care from several
providers that promised not to sell her name to third parties, she
could report a different middle initial to each provider. She could
then identify the provider that broke the agreement by noticing
the middle initials that later appeared on an unsolicited marketing
letter. These sorts of strategies, however, are both costly (in
time and effort) and likely to be ineffective. A company using the
patient's name, for instance, could cross-check her address with
her real name, and thereby insert the correct middle initial. In
addition, modern health care often requires protected health information
to flow legitimately among multiple entities for purposes of treatment,
payment, health care operations, and other necessary uses. Even
if the patient could identify the provider whose data ultimately
leaked, the patient could not easily tell which of those multiple
entities had impermissibly transferred her information.
The cost and ineffectiveness of monitoring logically leads to less
than optimal protection of health information. Consider the incentives
facing a company that acquires protected health information. That
company gains the full benefit of using the information, including
in its own marketing efforts or in the fee it can receive when it
sells the information to third parties. The company, however, does
not suffer the full losses from disclosure of protected health information.
Because of imperfect monitoring, customers often will not learn
of, and thus not be able to enforce against, that unauthorized use.
They will not be able to discipline the company efficiently in the
marketplace for its less-than-optimal privacy practices. Because
the company internalizes the gains from using the information, but
does not bear a significant share of the cost to patients (in terms
of lost privacy), it will have a systematic incentive to over-use
protected health information. In market failure terms, companies
will have an incentive to use protected health information where
the patient would not have freely agreed to such use.
These difficulties in contract enforcement are made worse by the
third-party nature of many health insurance and payment systems.
Even where individuals would wish to bargain for privacy, they may
lack the legal standing to do so. For instance, employers often
negotiate the terms of health plans with insurers. The employee
may have no voice in the privacy or other terms of the plan, facing
a take-it-or-leave-it choice of whether to be covered by insurance.
The incentive of employers may be contrary to the wishes of employees
-- employers may in some cases inappropriately insist on having
access to sensitive medical information in order to monitor employees'
behavior and health status. In light of these complexities, there
are likely significant market failures in the bargaining on privacy
protection. Many privacy-protective agreements that patients would
wish to make, absent barriers to bargaining, will not be reached.
The economic, legal and philosophical arguments become more compelling
as the medical system shifts from predominantly paper to predominantly
electronic records. From an economic perspective, market failures
will arise to the extent that privacy is less well protected than
the parties would have agreed to, if they were fully informed and
had some equality of bargaining power. The chief market failures
with respect to privacy concern information and bargaining costs.
The information costs arise because of the information asymmetry
between the company and the patient -- the company typically knows
far more than the patient about how the information will be used
by that company. A health care provider or plan, for instance, knows
many details about how protected health information will be generated,
combined with other databases, or sold to third parties.
Rapid changes in information technology mean that the size of the
market failures will likely increase greatly in the markets for
personal health information. Improvements in computers and networking
mean that the costs of gathering, analyzing, and disseminating electronic
data are plunging. Market forces are leading many medical providers
and plans to shift from paper to electronic records, due both to
lower cost and the increased functionality provided by having information
in electronic form. These market changes will be accelerated by
the administrative simplification implemented by the other regulations
promulgated under HIPAA. A chief goal of administrative simplification,
in fact, is to create a more efficient flow of medical information
where appropriate. This proposed privacy regulation is an integral
part of the overall effort of administrative simplification; it
creates a framework for more efficient flows for certain purposes,
including treatment and payment, while restricting flows in other
circumstances except where appropriate institutional safeguards
exist.
If the medical system shifts to predominantly electronic records
in the near future, without use of accompanying privacy rules, then
one can imagine a near future where clerical and medical workers
all over the country may be able to pull up protected health information
about individuals -- without meaningful patient consent and without
effective institutional controls against further dissemination.
In terms of the market failure, it will become more difficult for
patients to know how their health provider or plan is using their
personal health information. It will become more difficult to monitor
the subsequent flows of protected health information, as the number
of electronic flows and possible points of leakage both increase.
Similarly, the costs and difficulties of bargaining to get the patients'
desired level of use will likely rise due the greater number and
types of entities that receive protected health information.
As the benefits section, below, discusses in more detail, the protection
of privacy and correcting the market failure have practical implications.
Where patients are concerned about lack of privacy protections,
they might fail to get medical treatment that they would otherwise
seek. This failure to get treatment may be especially likely for
certain conditions, including mental health, substance abuse, and
conditions such as HIV. Similarly, patients who are concerned about
lack of privacy protections may report inaccurately to their providers
when they do seek treatment. For instance, they might decide not
to mention that they are taking prescription drugs that indicate
that they have an embarrassing condition. These inaccurate reports
may lead to mis-diagnosis and less- than-optimal treatment, including
inappropriate additional medications. In short, the lack of privacy
safeguards can lead to efficiency losses in the form of foregone
or inappropriate treatment.
The shift from paper to electronic records, with the accompanying
greater flows of sensitive health information, also strengthens
the arguments for giving legal protection to the right to privacy
in protected health information. In an earlier period where it was
far more expensive to access and use medical records, the risk of
harm to individuals was relatively low. In the potential near future,
where technology makes it almost free to send lifetime medical records
over the Internet, the risks may grow rapidly. It may become cost-effective,
for instance, for companies to offer services that allow purchasers
to obtain details of a person's physical and mental treatments.
In addition to legitimate possible uses for such services, malicious
or inquisitive persons may download medical records for purposes
ranging from identity theft to embarrassment to prurient interest
in the life of a celebrity or neighbor. Of additional concern, such
services might extend to providing detailed genetic information
about individuals, without their consent. Many persons likely believe
that they have a right to live in society without having these details
of their lives laid open to unknown and possibly hostile eyes. These
technological changes, in short, may provide a reason for institutionalizing
privacy protections in situations where the risk of harm did not
previously justify writing such protections into law.
States have, to varying degrees, attempted to enhance confidentiality
and correct the market problems by establishing laws governing at
least some aspects of medical record privacy. This approach, though
a step in the right direction, is inadequate. The states themselves
have a patch quilt of laws that fail to provide a consistent or
comprehensive policy, and there is considerable variation among
the states in the scope of the protections provided. Moreover, health
data is becoming increasingly national; as more information
becomes available in electronic form, it can have value far beyond
the immediate community where the patient resides. Neither private
action nor state laws provide a sufficiently rigorous legal structure
to correct the market failure now or in the future. Hence, a national
policy with consistent rules is a vital step toward correcting the
market failure that exists.
In summarizing the need for the proposed regulation, the discussion
here has emphasized how the proposed regulation would address violations
of a right to privacy in the information about oneself, market failures,
and the need for a national policy. These arguments become considerably
stronger with the shift from predominantly paper to predominantly
electronic records. Other arguments could supplement these justifications.
As discussed in the benefits section below, the proposed privacy
protections may prevent or reduce the risk of unfair treatment or
discrimination against vulnerable categories of persons, such as
those who are HIV positive, and thereby, foster better health. The
proposed regulation may also help educate providers, plans, and
the general public about how protected health information is used.
This education, in turn, may lead to better information practices
in the future.
Clearly, the growing problem of protecting privacy is widely understood
and a major public concern. Over 80 percent of persons surveyed
in 1999 agreed with the statement that they had "lost all control
over their personal information." A Wall Street Journal/NBC
poll on September 16, 1999 asked Americans what concerned them most
in the coming century. "Loss of personal privacy" topped
the list, as the first or second concern of 29percent of respondents.
Other issues such as terrorism, world war, and global warming had
scores of 23percent or less. The regulation is a major step toward
addressing this public concern.
D. Baseline Privacy Protections.
Determining the impact of the rule on covered entities requires
us to establish a baseline for current privacy policies. We must
first determine current practices and requirements related to protected
information -- specifically, practices related to disclosure and
use, notification of individuals of information practices, inspection
and copying, amendment and correction, administrative policies,
procedures, and related documentation.
Privacy practices are most often shaped by professional organizations
that publish ethical codes of conduct and by State law. On occasion,
State laws defer to professional conduct codes. At present, where
neither professional organizations nor States have developed guidelines
for privacy practices, an entity may implement privacy practices
independently.
Professional codes of conduct or ethical behavior generally can
be found as opinions and guidelines developed by organizations such
as the American Medical Association, the American Hospital Association,
and the American Dental Association. These are generally issued
though an organizations governing body. The codes do not have
the force of law, but providers often recognize them as binding
rules.
State laws are another important means of protecting health information.
While professional codes of conduct usually only have slight variations,
State laws vary dramatically. Some States defer to the professional
codes of conduct, others provide general guidelines for privacy
protection, and others provide detailed requirements relating to
the protection of information relating to specific diseases or to
entire classes of information. In cases where neither State law
nor professional ethical standards exist, the only privacy protection
individuals have is limited to the policies and standards that the
health care entity adopts.
Before we can attempt to determine the impact of the proposed rule
on covered entities, we must make an effort to establish the present
level of privacy protection. Current privacy protection practices
are determined by the standards and practices that the professional
associations have adopted for their members and by State laws.
1. Professional Codes of Conduct and the Protection of Health
Information.
We examined statements issued by five major professional groups,
one national electronic network association and a leading managed
care association. There are a number of common themes that all the
organizations appear to subscribe to:
- The need to maintain and protect an individuals health
information;
- Development of policies to ensure the confidentiality of protected
health information;
- Only the minimum necessary information should be released to
accomplish the purpose for which the information is sought.
Beyond these principles, the major associations differ with respect
to the methods used to protect health information. One critical
area of difference is the extent to which professional organizations
should release protected health information. A major mental health
association advocates the release of identifiable patient information
. . .only when de-identified data are inadequate for the purpose
at hand. A major association of physicians counsels members
who use electronically maintained and transmitted data to require
that they and their patients know in advance who has access to protected
patient data, and the purposes for which the data will be used.
In another document, the association advises physicians not to sell
patient information to data collection companies without fully informing
their patients of this practice and receiving authorization in advance
to release of the information.
Only two of the five professional groups state that patients have
the right to review their medical records. One group declares this
as a fundamental patient right, while the second association qualifies
their position by stating that the physician has the final word
on a patients access to their health information. This association
also recommends that its members respond to requests for access
to patient information within 10 days, and recommends that entities
allow for an appeal process when patients are denied access. The
association further recommends that when a patient contests the
accuracy of the information in their record and the entity refuses
to accept the patients change, the patients statement
should be included as a permanent part of the patients record.
In addition, three of the five professional groups endorse the
maintenance of audit trails that can track the history of disclosures
of protected health information.
The one set of standards that we reviewed from a health network
association advocated the protection of private health information
from disclosure without patient authorization and emphasized that
encrypting information should be a principal means of protecting
patient information. The statements of a leading managed care association,
while endorsing the general principles of privacy protection, were
vague on the release of information for purposes other than treatment.
They suggest allowing the use of protected health information without
the patients authorization for what they term health
promotion. It is possible that the use of protected health
information for health promotion may be construed under
the proposed rule as part of marketing activities.
Based on the review of the leading association standards, we believe
that the proposed rule embodies all the major principles expressed
in the standards. However, there are some major areas of difference
between the proposed rule and the professional standards reviewed.
These include the subject individuals right of access to health
information in the covered entitys possession, relationships
between contractors and covered entities, and the requirement that
covered entities make their privacy policies and practices available
to patients through a notice and the ability to respond to questions
related to the notice. Because the proposed regulation would require
that (with a few exceptions) patients have access to their health
information that a covered entity possesses, large numbers of providers
may have to modify their current practices in order to allow patient
access, and to establish a review process if they deny a patient
access. Also, none of the privacy protection standards reviewed
require that providers or plans prepare a formal statement of privacy
practices for patients (although the major physician association
urges members to inform patients about who would have access to
their protected health information and how their health information
would be used). Only one HMO association explicitly made reference
to information released for legitimate research purposes, and none
of the other statements we reviewed discuss release of information
for research purposes. The proposed rule allows for the release
of protected health information for research purposes without an
individuals authorization, but only for research that is supervised
by an institutional research board or an equivalent privacy board.
This research requirement may cause some groups to revise their
disclosure authorization standards.
2. State Laws.
The second body of privacy protections is found in a myriad of
State laws and requirements. To determine whether or not the proposed
rule would preempt a State law, we first identified the relevant
laws, and second, determined whether state or federal law provides
individuals with greater privacy protection.
Identifying the relevant state statutes: Health privacy
statutes can be found in laws applicable to many issues including
insurance, workers compensation, public health, birth and
death records, adoptions, education, and welfare. For example, Florida
has over 60 laws that apply to protected health information. According
to the Georgetown Privacy Project (6), Florida
is not unique. Every State has laws and regulations covering some
aspect of medical information privacy. In many cases, State laws
were enacted to address a specific situation, such as the reporting
of HIV/AIDS, or medical conditions that would impair a persons
ability to drive a car. Identifying every State statute, regulation,
and court case that interprets statutes and regulations dealing
with patient medical privacy rights is an important task but cannot
be completed in this discussion. For the purpose of this analysis,
we simply acknowledge the complexity of State requirements surrounding
privacy issues.
Lastly, we recognize that the private sector will need to complete
a State-by-State analysis to comply with the notice and administrative
procedures portion of this proposed rule. This comparison should
be completed in the context of individual markets; therefore it
is more efficient for professional associations or individual businesses
to complete this task.
Recognizing limits of our ability to effectively summarize State
privacy laws and our difficulty in determining preemption at the
outset, we discuss conclusions generated by the Georgetown University
Privacy Project in Janlori Goldmans report, The State of Health
Privacy: An Uneven Terrain. We consider Georgetowns report
the best and most comprehensive examination of State privacy laws
currently published. The report, which was completed in July 1999,
is based on a 50-state survey. However, the author is quick to point
out that this study is not exhaustive.
The following analysis of State privacy statutes and our attempt
to compare State laws to the proposed rule is limited as a result
of the large amount of State-specific data available. To facilitate
discussion, we have organized the analysis into two sections: access
to medical information and disclosure of medical information. Our
analysis is intended to suggest areas where the proposed rule appears
to preempt various State laws; it is not designed to be a definitive
or wholly comprehensive State-by-State comparison.
Access to Subjects Information: In general,
State statutes provide individuals with access to their own medical
records. However, only a few States allow individuals access to
virtually all entities that hold health information. In 33 States,
individuals may access their hospital and health facility records.
Only 13 States guarantee individuals access to their HMO records,
and 16 States provide individuals access to their medical information
when it is held by insurers. Seven states have no statutory right
of patient access; three States and the District of Columbia have
laws that only assure individuals right to access their mental
health records. Only one State permits individuals access to records
held by providers, but it excludes pharmacists from the definition
of provider. Thirteen States grant individuals statutory right of
access to pharmacy records.
The amount that entities are allowed to charge for copying of individuals
records varies widely from State to State. A study conducted by
the American Health Information Management Association (7)
found considerable variation in the amounts, structure, and combination
of fees for search and retrieval, and the copying of the record.
In 35 States, there are laws or regulations that set a basis for
charging individuals inspecting and copying fees. Charges vary not
only by State, but also by whether the request is related to a workers
compensation case or a patient-initiated request. Charges also vary
according to the setting. For example, States differentiate most
often between clinics and hospitals. Also, charges vary by the number
of pages and whether the request is for X-rays or for standard medical
information.
Of the 35 States with laws regulating inspection and copying charges,
seven States either do not allow charges for retrieval of records
or require that the entity provide the first copy free of charge.
Some States may prohibit hospitals from charging patients a retrieval
and copying fee, but allow clinics to do so. It is noteworthy that
some States that do not permit charges for retrieval sometimes allow
entities to charge per-page rates ranging between $0.50 and $0.75.
In States that do allow a retrieval charge, the per-page charge
is usually $0.25. Eleven states specify only that the record holder
may charge reasonable/actual costs.
Of the States that allow entities to charge for record retrieval
and copying, charges range from a flat amount of $1.00 to $20.00.
Other States allow entities to charge varying rates depending on
the amount of material copied. For example, an entity may charge
$5.00 for the first five pages and then a fixed amount per page.
In those cases, it appears that retrieval and copying costs were
actually combined. The remaining States have a variety of cost structures:
One State allows $0.25 per page plus postage plus a $15.00 retrieval
charge. Another State allows a $1.00 charge per page for the first
25 pages and $0.25 for each page above 25 pages plus a $1.00 annual
retrieval charge. A third state allows a $1.00 per page charge for
the first 100 pages and $0.25 for each page thereafter.
According to the report by the Georgetown Privacy Project, among
States that do grant access to patient records, the most common
basis for denying individuals access is concern for the life and
safety of the individual or others. This proposed rule considers
the question of whether to deny patient access on the basis of concern
for the individuals life or safety, concluding that the benefits
of patient access most often outweigh harm to the individual. This
issue, which is discussed in greater detail in other sections, has
been resolved in favor of promoting patient access.
The amount of time an entity is given to supply the individual
with his or her record varies widely. Many States allow individuals
to amend or correct inaccurate health information, especially information
held by insurers. However, few States provide the right to insert
a statement in the record challenging the covered entitys
information when the individual and entity disagree. (8)
Disclosure of Health Information: State laws vary
widely with respect to disclosure of identifiable health information.
Generally, States have applied restrictions on the disclosure of
health information either to specific entities or to specific health
conditions. Just two states place broad limits on disclosure of
protected health information without regard for policies and procedures
developed by covered entities. Most States require patient authorization
before an entity may disclose health information, but as the Georgetown
report points out, In effect, the authorization may function
more as a waiver of consent -- the patient may not have an opportunity
to object to any disclosures. (9)
It is also important to point out that none of the States appear
to offer individuals the right to restrict disclosure of their protected
health information for treatment. Thus, the provision of the proposed
rule that allows patients to restrict disclosure of the their protected
information is not currently included in any State law. Because
the ability to restrict disclosure currently is not a standard practice,
the proposed rule would require entities to add these capabilities
to their information systems.
State statutes often have exceptions to requiring authorization
before disclosure. The most common exceptions are for purposes of
treatment, payment, or auditing and quality assurance functions
-- which are similar to the definition we have established for health
care operations, are therefore not subject to prior authorization
requirements under the proposed rule. Restrictions on re-disclosure
of protected health information also vary widely from State to State.
Some States restrict the re-disclosure of health information, and
others do not. The Georgetown report cites State laws that require
providers to adhere to professional codes of conduct and ethics
with respect to disclosure and re- disclosure of protected health
information. What is not clear is the degree to which individual
information is improperly released or used in the absence of specific
legal sanctions.
Most States have adopted specific measures to provide additional
protections with regard to certain conditions or illnesses that
have clear social or economic consequences. Although the Georgetown
study does not indicate the number of States that have adopted disease-specific
measures to protect information related to sensitive conditions
and illnesses, the analysis seems to suggest that nearly all States
have adopted some form of additional protection. The conditions
and illnesses most commonly afforded added privacy protection are:
- Substance abuse;
- Information derived from genetic testing;
- Communicable and sexually-transmitted diseases;
- Mental health; and
- Abuse, neglect, domestic violence, and sexual assault.
We have included a specific discussion of disclosures for research
purposes because if an entity decides to disclose information for
research purposes, it will incur costs that otherwise would be associated
with other disclosures under this rule. Some States place restrictions
on releasing condition-specific health information for research
purposes, while others allow release of information for research
without the patients authorization. States frequently require
that researchers studying genetic diseases, HIV/AIDS, and other
sexually transmitted diseases have different authorization and privacy
controls than those used for other types of research. Some States
require approval from an IRB or agreements that the data will be
destroyed or identifiers removed at the earliest possible time.
Another approach has been for States to require researchers to obtain
sensitive, identifiable information from a State public health department.
One State does not allow automatic release of protected health information
for research purposes without notifying the subjects that their
health information may be used in research and allowing them opportunity
to object to the use of their information. (10)
Comparing State statutes to the proposed rule: A
comparison of State privacy laws with the proposed rule highlights
several of the proposed rules key implications:
- No State law requires covered entities to make their privacy
and access policies available to patients. Thus, all covered entities
that have direct contact with patients will be required to prepare
a statement of their privacy protection and access policies. This
necessarily assumes that entities have to develop procedures if
they do not already have them in place.
- The proposed rule will affect more entities than are affected
under many State laws. In the application of the proposed rule
to providers, plans, and clearinghouses, the proposed rule will
reach nearly all entities involved in delivering and paying for
health care. Yet because HIPAA applies only to information that
has been stored and transmitted electronically, the extent to
which the proposed rule will reach information held by covered
entities is unclear.
- State laws have not addressed the form in which health information
is stored. We do not know whether covered entities will choose
to treat information that never has been maintained or transmitted
electronically in the same way that they treat post- electronic
information. We also do not know what portion of information held
in non- electronic formats has ever been electronically maintained
or transmitted. Nevertheless, the proposed rule would establish
a more level floor from which States could expand the privacy
protections to include both electronic information and non-electronic
information.
- Among the three categories of covered entities, it appears
that plans will be the most significantly affected by the access
provisions of the proposed rule. Based on the Health Insurance
Association of America (HIAA) data (11), there
are approximately 94.7 million non-elderly persons who purchase
health insurance in the 35 States that do not provide patients
a legal right to inspect and copy their records. We do not have
information on how many of those people are in plans that grant
patients inspection and copying rights although State law does
not require them to do so. We discuss these points more fully
in the cost analysis section.
- Although the proposed rule would establish a uniform disclosure
and re- disclosure requirement for all covered entities, the groups
most likely to be affected are health insurers, benefits management
administrators, and managed care organizations. These groups have
the greatest ability and economic incentives to use protected
health information for marketing services to both patients and
physicians without individual authorization. Under the proposed
rule, covered entities would have to obtain the individuals
authorization before they could use or disclose their information
for purposes other than treatment, payment, and health care operations
-- except in the situations explicitly defined as allowable disclosures
without authorization.
- While our proposed rule appears to encompass many of the requirements
found in current State laws, it also is clear that within State
laws, there are many provisions that cover specific cases and
health conditions. Certainly, in States that have no research
disclosure requirements, the proposed rule will establish a baseline
standard. But in States that do place conditions on the disclosure
of protected health information, the proposed rule may place additional
requirements on covered entities.
- State privacy laws do not always apply to entities covered
by the proposed rule. For example, State laws may provide strong
privacy protection for hospitals and doctors but not for dentists
or HMOs. State laws protecting particular types of genetic testing
or conditions may be similarly problematic because they protect
some types of sensitive information and not others. In some instances,
a patients right to inspect his or her medical record may
be covered under State laws and regulations when a physician has
the medical information, but not under State requirements when
the information being sought is held by a plan. Thus, the proposed
rule would extend privacy requirements already applicable to some
entities within a State to other entities that currently are not
subject to State privacy requirements.
3. Federal Laws.
The Privacy Act of 1974
Federal agencies will be required to comply with both the Privacy
Act of 1974 (5 U.S.C. § 552a) and the HIPAA regulation. The
Privacy Act provides Federal agencies with a framework and scheme
for protecting privacy, and the HIPAA regulation will not alter
that scheme. Basic organizational and management features, such
as the provision of safeguards to protect the privacy of health
information and training for employees -- which are required by
this proposed rule -- already are required by the Privacy Act.
The proposed rule has been designed so that individuals will not
have fewer rights than they have now under the Privacy Act. It may
require that agencies obtain individual authorization for some disclosures
that they now make without authorization under routine uses.
Private-sector organizations with contracts to conduct personal
data handling activities for the Federal government are subject
to the Privacy Act by virtue of performing a function on behalf
of a Federal agency. They too will be required to comply with both
rules in the same manner as Federal agencies.
Substance Abuse Confidentiality Statute
Organizations that operate specialized substance abuse treatment
facilities and that either receive Federal assistance or are regulated
by a Federal agency are subject to confi dentiality rules established
by Section 543 of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. §
290dd-2) and implementing regulations at 42 C.F.R part 2.
These organizations will be subject both to that statute and to
the HIPAA regula tion. The proposed rule should have little practical
effect on the disclosure policies of these organizations, because
the patient confidentiality statute governing information about
substance abuse is generally more restrictive than this proposed
rule. These organizations will continue to be subject to current
restrictions on their disclosures. The substance abuse confidentiality
statute does not address patient access to records; the proposed
privacy rule makes clear that patient access is allowed.
Federal agencies are subject to these requirements, and currently
they administer their records under both these requirements and
the Privacy Act. The Department of Veterans Affairs is subject to
its own substance abuse confidentiality statute, which is identical
in substance to the one of more general applicability. It also covers
information about HIV infection and sickle cell anemia (38 U.S.C.
§ 7332).
Rules Regarding Protection of Human Subjects
Health care delivered by covered entities conducting clinical trials
typically are subject to both the proposed rule and to Federal regulations
for protection of human re search subjects (The Federal Policy
for the Protection of Human Subjects, codified for the Department
of Health and Human Services in Title 45 C.F.R. part 46, and/or
the Food and Drug Administrations human subject regulations
for research in support of medical product applications to the Food
and Drug Administration, or regulated by that agency, at 21 C.F.R.
parts 50 and 56).
Current human subjects rules impose no substantive restrictions
on disclosure of patient information. Institutional review boards
must consider the adequacy of confidenti ality protections for subjects,
and researchers must tell subjects to what extent their confi dentiality
will be protected. There should be no conflict between these requirements
and the proposed rules. The proposed HIPAA regulation will expand
on the current human subjects requirements by requiring a more detailed
description of intended use of patient information. The proposed
HIPAA rule also requires additional criteria for waiver of patient
authorization.
Medicaid
States may use information they obtain in the process of administering
Medicaid only for the purposes of administering the program, pursuant
to a State plan condition in section 1902(a)(7) of the Social Security
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(7). The proposed HIPAA rule applies
to State Medicaid programs, which under the rule are considered
health plans. There will be no conflict in the substantive requirements
of current rules and this proposed rule. Medicaid rules regarding
disclosure of patient information are stricter than provisions of
the proposed rule; therefore, Medicaid agencies simply will continue
to follow the Medicaid rules.
ERISA
ERISA (29 U.S.C. 1002) was enacted in 1974 to regulate pension
and welfare employee benefit plans that are established by private-sector
employers, unions, or both, to provide benefits to their workers
and dependents. An employee welfare benefit plan provides benefits
-- through insurance or otherwise -- such as medical, surgical benefits,
as well as benefits to cover accidents, disability, death, or unemployment.
In 1996, HIPAA amended ERISA to require portability, nondiscrimination,
and renewability of health benefits provided by group health plans
and group health insurance issuers. Many, although not all, ERISA
plans are covered under the proposed rule as health plans. We believe
that the proposed rule does not conflict with ERISA. Further discussion
of ERISA can be found in the preamble for this proposed rule.
E. Costs.
Affected entities will be implementing the privacy proposed rules
at the same time many of the administrative simplification standards
are being implemented. As described in the overall impact analysis
for the administrative simplification standards in the Federal Register,
Vol. 63, No. 88, May 7, 1998, page 25344, the data handling changes
occurring due to the other HIPAA standards will have both costs
and benefits. To the extent the changes required for the privacy
standards implementations can be made concurrently with the changes
required for the other standards, costs for the combined implementation
should be only marginally higher than for the administrative simplification
standards alone. The extent of this additional cost is uncertain,
in the same way that the costs associated with each of the individual
administrative simplification standards was uncertain.
The costs associated with implementing the privacy standards will
be directly related to the number of affected entities and the number
of affected transactions in each entity. (12)
We chose to use the SBA data in the RFA because we wanted our analysis
to be as consistent to SBA definitions as possible to give the greatest
accuracy for the RFA purposes. As described in the overall administrative
simplification impact estimates (Tables 1 and 2, page 25344), about
20,000 health plans (excluding non-self administered employer plans)
(13) and hundreds of thousands of providers
face implementation costs. In the administrative simplification
analysis, the costs of provider system upgrades were expected to
be $3.6 billion over the period 1998-2002, and plan system cost
upgrades were expected to be $2.2 billion. (In the aggregate, this
$5.8 billion cost is expected to be more than completely offset
by $7.3 billion in savings during the 5 year period analyzed).
The relationship between the HIPAA security and privacy standards
is particularly relevant. On August 12, 1998, the Secretary published
a proposed rule to implement the HIPAA standards on security and
electronic standards. That rule specified the security requirements
for covered entities that transmit and store information specified
in Part C, Title XI of the Act. In general, that rule would establish
the administrative and technical standards for protecting ...any
health information pertaining to an individual that is electronically
maintained or transmitted. (63 FR 43243). The security rule
is intended to spell out the system and administrative requirements
that a covered entity must meet in order to assure itself and the
Secretary that the protected health information is safe from destruction
and tampering from people without authorization for its access.
By contrast, the privacy rule describes the policies and procedures
that would govern the circumstances under which protected health
information may be used and released with and without patient authorization
and when a patient may have access to his or her protected medical
information. This rule assumes that a covered entity will have in
place the appropriate security apparatus to successfully carry out
and enforce the provisions contained in the security rule.
Although the vast majority of health care entities are privately
owned and operated, Federal, State, and local government providers
are reflected in the total costs. (14)
Federal, state, and locally funded hospitals represent approximately
26 percent of hospitals in the United States. This is a significant
portion of hospitals, but represents a relatively small proportion
of all provider entities. The number of government providers who
are employed at locations other than government hospitals is significantly
smaller (approximately 2 percent of all providers). Weighting the
relative number of government hospital and non-hospital providers
by the revenue these types of providers generate, we estimate that
health care services provided directly by government entities represent
3.4 percent of total health care services. IHS and Tribal facilities
costs are included in the total, since the adjustments made to the
original private provider data to reflect federal providers included
them. In drafting the proposed rule the Department consulted with
States, representatives of the National Congress of American Indians,
representatives of the National Indian Health Board, and a representative
of the self-governance tribes. During the consultation we discussed
issues regarding the application of Title II of HIPAA to the States
and Tribes.
Estimating the costs associated with the privacy proposed rule
involves, for each provision, consideration of both the degree to
which covered entities must modify their records management systems
and privacy policies under the proposed rule, and the extent to
which there is a change in behavior of both patients and the covered
entities as a result of the proposed rule. In the following sections
we will examine these provisions as they would apply to the various
covered entities as they undertake to comply with the proposed rule.
The major costs that covered entities will incur are one time costs
associated with implementation of the proposed rules, and ongoing
costs that result from changes in behavior that both the covered
entities and patients would make in response to the new proposed
rules.
We have quantified the costs imposed by the proposed regulation
to the extent that we had adequate data. In some areas, however,
there was too little data to support quantitative estimates. As
a result, the RIA does not include cost estimates for all of the
requirements of the regulation. The areas for which explicit cost
estimates have not be made are: the principle of minimum necessary
disclosure; the requirement that entities monitor business partners
with whom they share PHI; creation of de-identified information;
internal complaint processes; sanctions; compliance and enforcement;
the designation of a privacy official and creation of a privacy
board; and additional requirements on research/optional disclosures
that will be imposed by the regulation. The cost of some of these
provisions may be significant, but it would be inaccurate to project
costs for these requirements given the fact that several of these
concepts are new to the industry.
The one time costs are primarily in the area of development and
codification of procedures. Specific activities include: (1) analysis
of the significance of the federal regulations on covered entity
operation; (2) development and documentation of policies and procedures
(including new ones or modification of existing ones); (3) dissemination
of such policies and procedures both inside and outside the organization;
(4) changing existing records management systems or developing new
systems; and (5) training personnel on the new policies and system
changes.
Covered entities will also incur ongoing costs. These are likely
to be the result of
(1) increased numbers of patient requests for access and copying
of their own records;
(2) the need for covered entities to obtain patient authorization
for uses of protected information that had not previously required
an authorization;
(3) increased patient interest in limiting payer and provider
access to their records;
(4) dissemination and implementation both internally and externally
of changes in privacy policies, procedures, and system changes;
and
(5) training on the changes.
Compliance with the proposed rule will cost $3.8 billion over five
years. These costs are in addition to the administrative simplification
estimates. The cost of complying with the regulation represents
0.09 percent of projected national health expenditures the first
year the regulation is enacted. The five year costs of the proposed
regulation also represents 1.0 percent of the increase in health
care costs experienced over the same five- year period. (15)
Because of the uncertainty of the data currently available, the
Department has made estimates on low and high
range assumptions of the key variables. These estimates show a range
of $ 1.8 to $6.3 billion over five years. It is important to note
that these estimates do not include the areas for which we have
made no cost estimates (discussed above).
Initial Costs
Privacy Policies and Procedures
With respect to the initial costs for covered entities, the expectation
that most of the required HIPAA procedures will be implemented as
a package suggests that additional costs for the privacy standards
should be small. Since the requirements for developing formal processes
and documentation of procedures mirror what will already have been
required under the security regulations, the additional costs should
be small. The expectation is that national and state associations
will develop guidelines or general sets of processes and procedures
and that these will generally be adopted by individual member entities.
Relatively few providers or entities are expected to develop their
own procedures independently or to modify significantly those developed
by their associations. Our estimates are based on assumed costs
for providers ranging from $300 to $3000, with the weighted average
being about $375. The range correlates to the size and complexity
of the provider, and is a reasonable estimate of the cost of coordinating
the policies and procedures outlined in the proposed regulation.
With fewer than 1 million provider entities, the aggregate cost
would be on the order of $300 million.For plans, our estimate assumes
that the legal review and development of written policies will be
more costly because of the scope of their operations. They are often
dealing with a large number of different providers and may be dealing
with requirements from multiple states. Again, we expect associations
to do much of the basic legal analysis but plans are more likely
to make individual adaptations. We believe this cost will range
from $300 for smaller plans and $15,000 for the largest plans. Because
there are very few large plans in relation to the number of small
plans, the weighted average implementation costs will be about $3050.
The total cost of development of policies and procedures for providers
and plans is estimated to be $395 million over five years.
System Compliance Costs
With respect to revisions to electronic data systems, the specific
refinements needed to fulfill the privacy obligations ought to be
closely tied to the refinements needed for security obligations.
The overall administrative simplification system upgrades (procedures,
systems, and training) of $5.8 billion would certainly be disproportionately
associated with the security standard, relative to the other 11
elements. If in privacy it constitutes 15 percent, then the security
standard would represent about $900 million system cost. If the
marginal cost of the privacy elements is another 10 percent, then
the addition cost would be $90 million.
Ongoing Costs
The recurrent costs may be more closely related to total numbers
of persons with claims than to the number of covered entities. The
number of individuals served by an entity will vary greatly. The
number of persons with claims will give a closer approximation of
how many people entities will have to interact with for various
provisions.
Notice of Privacy Practices
No State laws or professional associations currently require entities
to provide patients notice of their privacy policies.
Thus, we expect that all entities will incur costs developing and
disseminating privacy policy notices. Each entity will have a notice
cost associated with each person to whom they provide services.
Data from the 1996 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey shows that there
are approximately 200 million ambulatory care encounters per year,
nearly 20 million persons with a hospital episode, 7 million with
home-health episodes, and over 170 million with prescription drug
use (350 million total). For the remaining four years of the five
year period, we have estimated that, on average, a quarter of the
remaining population will enter the system, and thus receive a notice.
If we account for growth in the number of people who may enter the
health care system over the five year period of our analysis, we
estimate that approximately 543 million patients will be seen at
least once by one or more types of providers.
The development cost for notices is estimated to cost $30 million
over five years, though most of this is likely to occur the first
year. The first year cost of providing notices to patients, customers
and plan enrollees would be $106 million. The total five year cost
of providing new and subsequent copies to all provider patients
and customers would be approximately $209 million.
The notice obligations of insurers apply on initial enrollment,
with updated notices at least every 3 years. However, given enrollment
changes and the sophistication of automation, we believe many plans
would find it cheaper and more efficient to provide annual notices.
The 1998 National Health Interview Survey (NHIS) from the Census
Bureau shows about 174.1 million persons are covered by private
health insurance, on an unduplicated basis. NHIS calculates that
persons who are privately insured hold approximately 1.3 policies
per person. Based on information provided by several plans, we believe
most plans would provide an independent mailing the first year,
but in subsequent years would provide notices as an inclusion in
other mailings. The cost for this would be $0.75 over five years.
If we account for these duplicate policies and assume that the cost
of sending the notices to a policyholder is $0.75, the total cost
to plans would be $231 million over five years. This includes both
public and private plans.
We request comments regarding our cost estimates for development
and distribution of notices.
The costs for more careful internal operation of covered entities
to execute their formal privacy procedures are highly dependent
on the extent to which current practice tracks the future procedures.
Entities that already have strict data sharing and confidentiality
procedures will incur minimal costs, since their activities need
not change much. Entities that have not developed explicit health
information privacy policies may be compelled to obtain patient
authorization in situations where they did not previously. These
changes will generate ongoing costs as well as initial costs. We
solicit comment with respect to the way current costs differ from
those projected by the requirements of the proposed privacy rule.
An example of such an area is the minimum necessary disclosure
principle - because of differing current practices, we do
not have data that reliably indicate how much this provision will
cost.
Inspection and Copying
The Georgetown report on State privacy laws indicates that 33 states
currently give patients some right to access medical information.
The most common right of access granted by State law is the right
to inspect personal information held by physicians and hospitals.
In the process of developing estimates for the cost of providing
access and copying, we assumed that most providers currently have
procedures for allowing patients to inspect and copying their own
record. Thus, we expect that the economic impact of requiring entities
to allow individuals to access and copy their records should be
relatively small. Copying costs, including labor, should be a fraction
of a dollar per page. We expect the cost to be passed on to the
consumer.
There are few studies that address the cost of providing medical
records to patients.
The most recent was a study in 1998 by the Tennessee Comtroller
of the Treasury. It found an average cost of $9.96 per request,
with an average of 31 pages per request. The total cost per page
of providing copies was $0.32 per page. This study was performed
on hospitals only. The cost per request may be lower for other types
of providers, since those seeking hospital records are more likely
to be sick and have more complicated records than those in a primary
care or other type of office. An earlier report showed much higher
costs than the Tennessee study. In 1992, Rose Dunn published a report
based on her experience as a manager of medical records. She estimated
a 10 page request would cost $5.32 in labor costs only, equaling
labor cost per page of $0.53. However, this estimate appears to
reflect costs before computerization. The expected time spent per
search was 30.6 minutes; 85 percent of this time could be significantly
reduced with computerization (this includes time taken for file
retrieval, photocopying, and re- filing; file retrieval is the only
time cost that would remain under computerization.) For subsequent
estimates, we will use the Tennessee experience.
The proposed regulation states that entities may charge patients
a reasonable fee to inspect and copy their health information. For
this reason, we expect the cost of inspecting and copying an individual
medical record to be passed on to consumers who request the service.
Nonetheless, it is important to provide an estimate of the potential
costs associated with inspection and copying. We assume that 1.5
percent of patients will request access to inspect and copy their
medical record, and that the cost of accessing and copying a record
is approximately $10 (as cited in the Tennessee study). The cost
of inspection and copying is $81 million a year, or $405 million
over five years. This cost is likely to be borne entirely by the
consumer.
Amendment and Correction
We have assumed that many providers make provisions to help patients
expedite amendment and correction of their medical record where
appropriate. However, as with inspection and copying, the right
to request amendment and correction of an individuals medical
record is not guaranteed by all States. Based on these assumptions
and our cost analysis, we conclude that the principal economic effect
of the proposed rule would be to expand the right to request amendment
and correction to plans and providers that are not covered by state
laws or codes of conduct. In addition, we expect that the proposed
rule may draw additional attention to the issue of record inaccuracies
and stimulate patient demand for access, amendment, and correction
of medical records.
Our cost calculations assume that persons who request an opportunity
to amend or correct their record have already obtained a copy of
their medical record. Therefore, the administrative cost of amending
and correcting the patients record is completely separate
from inspection and copying costs. In this section we have only
addressed the cost of disputing a factual statement within the patient
record, and do not calculate the cost of appeals or third party
review.
Administrative review of factual statements contained within a
patients record may be expensive. Most errors may be of a
nature that a clerk or nurse can correct (e.g., the date of a procedure
is incorrect) but some may require physician review. Thus, we have
estimated that the average cost of amending and correcting a patient
record may be $75 per instance.
If amendment and correction requests are associated with two-thirds
of requests for inspection and copying, and the cost of correcting
(or noting the patients request for correction) is $75, the
total cost of amending and correcting patient records will be $407
million annually, or $2 billion over five years. Comments on our
estimate of amendment and correction costs would be helpful, particularly
if they speak to current amendment and correction costs or frequency
in the health care industry.
Reconstructing a history of disclosures (other than for treatment
and payment)
To our knowledge, no current State law or professional code requires
providers and plans to maintain the capability to reconstruct a
patients health information history. Therefore, the requirement
in this rule to be able to reconstruct the disclosure history of
protected health information is completely new. Although it is likely
that some providers and plans have already developed this capability,
we assume that all providers and plans would be required to invest
in developing the capacity to generate disclosure histories.
With respect to reconstruction of disclosure history, two sets
of costs would exist. On electronic records, fields for disclosure
reason, information recipient, and date would have to be built into
the data system. The fixed cost of the designing the system to include
this would be a component of the $90 million additional costs discussed
earlier. The ongoing cost would be the data entry time, which should
be at de minimis levels. Comments would again be especially useful
with respect to the extent to which recording the additional information
goes beyond current practice.
Authorizations
Although many States have laws that require entities to obtain
patient authorization before releasing individually identified health
information to payers and other third parties, many of the authorization
requirements either allow for blanket authorizations that deprive
the patient of meaningful control over the release of their health
information, or the authorization statutes are less stringent than
the provisions of the proposed rule. Therefore, for purposes of
estimating the economic impact of the NPRM, we are assuming that
all providers and plans will have to develop new procedures to conform
to the proposed rule.
Written patient authorization requirements will generate costs,
to the extent covered entities are currently releasing information
in the targeted circumstances without specific authority. Collecting
such authorization should have costs on the order of those associated
with providing access to records (not on a per page basis). The
frequency of such collections is unknown. Since the requirement
does not apply to treatment and payment, assuming 1 percent of the
543 million encounters over five years might be reasonable. At a
cost of about $10 each, the aggregate cost would be about $54 million
annually, or $271million over five years. Comments would be especially
useful from entities currently following such procedures.
Training
The ongoing costs associated with paperwork and training are likely
to be minimal. Because training happens as a regular business practice,
and employee certification connected to this training is also the
norm, we estimate that the marginal cost of paperwork and training
is likely to be small. We assume a cost of approximately $20 per
provider office, and approximately $60-100 for health plans and
hospitals. Thus, we estimate that the total cost of paperwork and
training will be $22 million a year.
Conclusion
Overall, the five-year costs beyond those already shown in the
administrative simplification estimates would be about $3.8 billion
over five years, with an estimated range of $1.8 to $6.3 billion.
Table 2 shows the components described above. The largest cost item
is for amendment and correction, which is over half of the estimated
total cost of the regulation. Inspection and copying, at $405 million
over five years, and issuance of notices by providers and plans,
at $439 million over five years, are the second biggest components.
The one-time costs of development of policies and procedures by
providers would represent approximately 10 percent of the total
cost, or $333 million. Plans and clearinghouses would have a substantially
smaller cost, about $62 million. Other systems changes are expected
to cost about $90 million over the period. Finally, the estimates
do not consider all of the costs imposed by the regulation.
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